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Were spreadsheets a vehicle for the Societe Generale fraud?

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5th Feb 2008
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A theory is circulating in IT security and compliance circles that inadequate, spreadsheet-based internal controls may have played a part in allowing Societe Generale's rogue trader Jerome Kerviel to build up positions that eventually resulted in a 7 billion euro loss for the bank. John Stokdyk reports.

According to reports based on his interview transcripts with French police, Kerviel knew colleagues' ID and password codes to create fictitious trading accounts and send email orders to build up his positions in the derivatives market. Although a low-ranking trader, Kerviel had worked in the bank's back and middle offices for five years, where he learned how the risk management software worked.

Some commentators have speculated that in addition to disguising his trades through a fictitious company and colleagues' accounts, he had been able to circumvent internal warning systems by opening and manipulating the Excel spreadsheet reports used by managers to monitor traders' activities.

Over at the Register, banking headhunter Dominic Conner drew on his Parisian contacts to produce a thoughtful analysis that suggested password security in the sector is not as rigorous as the rest of us might expect, leading to a Kerviel-like scenario he described as "permission creep".

He explained: "A common bad technique is to embed usernames and passwords into applications, especially Excel report sheets. These tend to be powerful administrator or developer accounts, granting unlimited access with little or no auditing."

A copy of Kerviel's CV doing the rounds on the internet indicates that he was not a super-boffin, but did know VBA, which would have been useful for doctoring spreadsheets to make them look as though trades were done by someone else.

"His VBA skills would have helped him a lot to keep the illusion alive," suggests Conner. "Knowing Excel, he would have been asked to sort out his colleagues' spreadsheets, and left sitting at their PCs able to execute any number of misdeeds while his colleague went off for lunch."

In an article published just before the Societe Generale scandal broke, Conner laid into the way quantitative models were used for financial analysis in banking, "so the basis for working out prices of derivatives is based upon the diffusion of heat through a metal bar". Excel is a very common tool for building such models, he explained, but the built-in functions are "garbage" and financial VBA is rarely done well - leading to just the kind of systematic vulnerabilities that Kerviel's fraud exposed.

Several other commentators jumped on the bandwagon. Dennis Howlett used the Societe Generale scandal to air his now-traditional spreadsheet rant on ZDNet. Compassoft CEO Paul Bach, meanwhile, saw it as an opportunity to promote his company's compliance tools.

"Spreadsheets are being used for business critical transactions every day," said Bach. "However, it is all too common to see a lack of even basic controls on these spreadsheets, let alone the type of controls that could be used to detect serious fraud or errors. If losses such as those suffered by Societe Generale are to be avoided in the future then it is imperative that companies monitor spreadsheet use on a broad scale, particularly in banking and finance organisations."

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By AnonymousUser
05th Feb 2008 15:45

SocGen report of Jan 24
Naturally, I'll be covering that angle in my newsletter too, but the official report is available online (PDF format)

"Financial instruments in portfolio A were in appearance offset by the fictitious operations housed in Portfolio B, which meant that the only visible risk was very low residual risk"

A timeline is given from Jan 18 to 23.

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Dennis Howlett
By dahowlett
05th Feb 2008 13:39

interesting
Thanks for the props John. I'd not seen the Register piece when I penned my crack at spreadsheets as part of the article at ZDN so serendipitous perhaps. Conner is being facetious when he talks about the models used by analysts. Yes they use spreadsheets to create the models but they're somewhat more sophisticated than he is giving credit for.

The spreadsheet angle is an interesting theory but my reading of the runes on this one is that SocGen had process control problems that were known but not acted upon. There were other warning signals flagging up transactions Kerviel was executing as I'd expect but again, not acted upon. They referred to Kerviel ''hacking' but that seems a stretch given other facts that are known.

As I've said elsewhere, there's a long way to go on this story before the final curtain comes down.

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By listerramjet
05th Feb 2008 13:05

this sounds like
pure speculation. But even if it is near the mark it describes mismanagement on a grand scale. Where were the compensating controls?

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